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Abstract 
Three different forrnalizations of concept-learning in logic (as well as some variants) are 
analyzed and related. It is shown that learning from interpretations reduces to learning from 
entailment, which in turn reduces to learning from satisfiability. The implications of this result for 
inductive logic programming and computational learning theory are then discussed, and guidelines 
for choosing a problem-setting are formulated. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Various formalisations of concept-learning in logic have been proposed, e.g. learn- 
ing from interpretations [ 1,7,30], learning from entailment [ 151, and several inductive 
logic programming settings [ 10,12,14,24,3 I]. These formalizations differ in their rep- 
resentation of examples and the corresponding membership function or coverage notion, 
which determines whether an example is covered by a concept. At present, it is an open 
question as to what the relation among these different formalizations is. This question 
has been raised in different forms and in different contexts. Firstly, in computational 
learning theory, [ 1,2,15] have wondered what the general relation is between learning 
from interpretations and learning from entailment, and which setting should be used for 
which type of learning problem. Secondly, in inductive logic programming it is unclear 
how systems such as FOIL [29] and Golem [25], which learn from entailment, re- 
late to systems such as ICL [9] and Claudien [6], which learn from interpretations. 
Furthermore, several variants have been proposed of these settings [ 11,3 11. Thirdly, 
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though computational learning theory and attribute-value learning techniques typically 
learn from interpretations, inductive logic programming has mainly addressed learning 
from entailment, which indicates that answers to the open question may also increase 
our understanding of the relation between inductive logic programming and attribute 
value learning. Fourthly, PAC-learning studies of inductive logic programming such as 
[ 3,7] have also left open the question as to whether learning from interpretations allows 
to PAC-learn classes of concepts that are not learnable from entailment. 
This paper contributes answers to the open questions raised above. More specifically, 
it will be shown that learning from interpretations reduces to learning from entailment, 
which in turn reduces to learning from satisfiability. Learning from satisfiability is a 
more recent setting that generalizes the other settings. In this setting, examples and 
hypotheses are both full clausal theories. 
It will also be shown that there exist propositional classes such as k-CNF that are 
PAC-learnable from interpretations, but that are not efficiently learnable from entailment 
or from satisfiability. The implications of this result for inductive logic programming, 
computational learning theory and attribute value learning are then analyzed. Further- 
more, practical suggestions for choosing the right problem-setting are formulated. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews some basic notions in 
logic; Section 3 introduces the different formalisations of concept-learning in clausal 
logic and investigates the relation among them; Section 4 discusses the implications 
of this relation for computational learning theory (this section may be skipped by the 
casual reader less interested in theory); Section 5 touches upon related work, and finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Logic 
We first review some standard concepts from the predicate calculus (see e.g. [ 161 
for more details). 
In this paper, an alphabet consists of a set of constant, functor and predicate symbols. 
A term t is either a constant, a variable or a compound term f( tt , . . . , tn) composed 
of an nary function symbol f, and n terms t;. An atom is a logical formula of the form 
P(h,. . , t,,), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and ti are terms. A literal is an 
atom or the negation 1A of an atom A. Atoms are positive literals, and negated atoms 
are negative literals. 
In propositional logic, no terms are considered. Thus in propositional logic, all pred- 
icates have 0 arity. In computational learning, one often employs CNF formulae, which 
are of the following form: 
(11.1 v . . v II,,,) A . . A (lk,, v . . v lk,&) 
where all Zi,.i are propositional literals. CNF expressions have also a natural upgrade in 
first order logic, namely clausal theories (or CT, for short): 
wi.l,. . . 9 VI,,., :lI,,v,“vl,,,,,)r\“‘r\(~vk,l ,..., v,.,., :ik,l v’..Vlk,,,,,) 
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where all l;,,i are literals and VI,], . . , V,,,., are all variables occurring in Ii.1 V . . V li,,,. 
The symbol V reads for all and stands for universal quantification. Each disjunction is 
called a cfause. A clause (‘~34, . . . ,~.:hlV-..Vh,,VlblV.-.V16,,) isoftenwritten 
as an implication kl V . V k, +- 01 A . . A b,,,. 
Interesting subsets of clausal logic, are Horn (respectively de$nite> clause logic. They 
consist of CT expressions that have at most one (respectively exactly one) positive literal 
in each clause. 
Interpretations are used to formalize truth and falsity of specific formulae and entail- 
ment. As we use only clausal logic, we will focus on so-called Herbrand interpretations, 
which can - for our purposes - be defined as sets of variable-free (i.e. ground) atoms 
over a given alphabet. According to a Herbrand interpretation all atoms in the interpre- 
tation are true, and all other atoms (over the alphabet) are false. In the propositional 
or boolean case, a Herbrand interpretation corresponds to a variable assignment, i.e. a 
truth assignment to the propositional atoms which are the “variables” of the formula. 
A substitution 6 = {K + fl,. . . , V,, + t,,} is an assignment of terms tt,. . , t, to 
variables VI,. . . , V,. The formula FB where F is a term, atom, literal or expression, and 
0 = {v, +- I], . . , v, t tn} is a substitution, is the formula obtained by simultaneously 
replacing all variables Vi,. , V, in F by the terms ft,. . . , t,,. 
A clausal theory T is true in a Herbrand interpretation I if TO is true in 1 for each 
substitution 8 for which TB is ground. A ground clausal theory T8 is true in I if and only 
if each clause of TO is true in I. A ground clause is true in I if one of the atoms that 
appears positively in the clause is true according to I or one of the atoms that appears 
negatively is false according to I. For example, JEies V Third V wbnormal is true in the 
interpretations Gflies}, {abnormal} but false in {bird,abnormal}. If a theory is true in 
an interpretation we also say that the interpretation is a model for the theory. 
Logical entailment and satisfiability are typically defined using interpretations. We 
will write F /= G (read F logically entails G) when all models of F are also a model 
for G, and F b 0 (read F is not satis$able) if there exists no interpretation that is a 
model of F. 
3. Concept-learning 
In concept-learning [22], one is given a language of concepts Lc, a language of 
examples L,, the covers or membership-relation EC that specifies how Lc relates to Le, 
and a set of examples E of an unknown target concept t E Lc. Each example is of the 
form (e, Class) where e E L, and Class is true orfalse. Examples (e, true) are positive 
examples, whereas examples (e,fulse) are negative. The aim in concept-learning is then 
to find a hypothesis H E Lc that covers all positive examples (i.e. H is complete) and 
none of the negative examples (i.e. H is consistent). 
3.1. Concept-learning in logic 
Logical approaches to concept-learning instantiate this definition by defining the 
representation languages for concepts LC and examples L,, as well as the coverage 
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EC relation among them. We will now investigate several possibilities for formalizing 
concept-learning in clausal logic. 
Roughly speaking, in inductive logic programming, hypotheses are clausal theories, 
examples are clauses, and a hypothesis covers an example if the hypothesis logically 
entails the example (cf. also Section 3.2.): 
Definition 1 (Learning from entailment). If H is a clausal theory and e a clause, then 
H covers e under entailment, notation e & H, if and only if H k e. 
We will call this setting learning from entailment following [ 151. 
Example 2. Let the examples be Cjlies t normal A bird, true), (flies + bird, false) 
and (C jlies A normal A bird, false). Then Pies + bird A normal is a solution. 
Another logical setting originates from the work on PAC-learning [ 7,301. In learning 
from interpretations, hypotheses are clausal theories, examples are Herbrand interpreta- 
tions and an example is covered when it is a model for the hypothesis. 
Definition 3 (Learning from interpretations). If H is a clausal theory and e a Herbrand 
interpretation, then H covers e under interpretations, notation e pi H, if and only if e is 
a mode1 for H. 
Example 4. Let examples be ( {bird, normal,Jies}; true) and ( { nomtal, bird}; false). 
Then flies + bird A normal is a solution. 
When learning from interpretations, it is implicitly assumed that each example is 
completely specified. Indeed, in propositional logic, all propositions should be either 
true or false. As a consequence, missing values cannot be represented in this framework. 
It has therefore been suggested by [ 1 l] to represent examples by partial interpretations. 
In a partial interpretation, certain ground atoms have an unknown truth-value (see below 
for a forma1 definition). Alternatively, [ 121 employs a second-order logic for dealing 
with this situation. 
A generalization of learning from partial interpretations, called learning from sati@- 
ability, is defined below. 
Definition 5 (Learning from satisjability) . If H and e are both clausal theories, then 
H covers e under satisfiability, notation e E, H, if and only if HA e # 0. 
Example 6. Let the examples be ({bird t; normal +-$es +-}; true), ({birdvjies +-; 
normal c}; true) and ({bird t; normal t; +-jies};false). Then flies +- bird ~norrnal 
is a solution. 
This notion of coverage (using the membership function E,) was proposed by [ 3 11. 
However, [ 3 11 did not choose full clausal logic to represent examples and hypotheses. 
Yet, this choice is essential for our purposes. 
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Whereas learning from entailment and learning from interpretations are well-known 
and well-motivated in the literature, we still need to answer the question as to Why 
learning from sutisfiability is useful? A first and tentative answer is that learning from 
satisfiability seems the most general setting possible within clausal logic as both ex- 
amples and hypotheses are clausal theories. We will soon show that the other settings 
defined above indeed reduce to learning from satisfiability. 
3.2. Relation among the different settings 
We will now investigate the relation between the different formalizations of concept- 
learning in logic using the concept of a solution-set: 
Definition 7. sol,(E) = {H 1 H is a clausal theory over a given alphabet such that for 
all (p, true) E E: p E, H and for all (n,fulse) E E: n & H} 
To investigate how one type of coverage notion relates to another type of coverage, 
we use reductions: 2 
Definition 8. A reduction from learning under E, to learning under E, is a function 
p that maps any example set E (under E,) onto an example set Ep = {p(e) 1 e E E} 
(under E,) such that sol,(E) = sol,. (E,) . 
If there exists a reduction p from learning under ~~ to learning under E,, we can 
solve learning problems under E, using the algorithms for E,. One merely has to map 
the example set E to Ep and run the algorithm under E,. The solutions generated under 
E,, will also be solutions under E,. We can then consider learning under E, a harder or 
more general task than learning under E,. Obviously: 
Property 9. lf there exist reductions from learning under E, to learning under E, 
and from learning under Ed to learning under E,, then there exists a reduction from 
learning under E, to learning under Ed. 
Some of the reductions will represent Herbrand interpretations by clausal theories as 
follows: 3 
Definition 10. Let i be a Herbrand interpretation in which tl, . . . , t, are the true facts, 
and fl , . . . , fnl are the false facts. Then 7 denotes the clausal theory { tl c; . . . ; t, t; 
+ft;...;+fn,}. 
*When talking about reductions, it will always be assumed that the language of concepts (including the 
alphabet) is fixed. This assumption is needed because some of the reductions studied below change the 
alphabet of the examples (using skolems). 
3 From a practical perspective, the definition can only be applied to finite Herbrand interpretations. With 
finite interpretations, we mean interpretations whose sets of true and false facts are both finite. However, 
Property 11 also holds for infinite Herbrand interpretations, which merely result in a theory consisting of an 
infinite number of clauses. Clausal theories may - in general - contain an infinite number of clauses; clauses 
must contain a finite number of literals. 
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One property of this transformation that follows directly from Proposition 3.2. in [ 211 
and that will be used in some of the proofs, goes as follows: 
Property 11. Let H be a clausal theory and i be a Herbrand interpretation. Then i is 
a modelfor H iffir\H #O. 
Let us now investigate the relation among learning from entailment and learning from 
satisfiability. 
Theorem 12. Learning from entailment reduces to learning from satisjiability. 
Proof. Define p( (e, Class)) = (le, Xlass), where e is a clause. The result then fol- 
lows from the observation that e & H iff le & H. Notice that if hl V. . .vh,, + bl A. . .A 
b, is a clause, its negation is the clausal theory + hla;. . . ; + h,cr; b,u +-; . . . ; b,c c, 
where q is a skolem substitution.4 0 
This theorem shows that learning from entailment is to be considered a special case 
of learning from satisjiability. The converse does not seem to hold, as clausal theories 
cannot in general be transformed into single clauses. 
Consider now the relation among learning from interpretations and learning from 
entailment: 
Theorem 13. Learning from finite interpretations reduces to learning from entailment. 
Proof. Define p( (e, Class) ) = (+, Xlass), where e is a finite Herbrand interpretation. 
The result then follows from the observation that i Ei H iff 75 ge H,’ which in turn 
follows from Property 11. Notice that if i is an interpretation with as true facts tl, . . . , t,, 
and as false facts f 1,. . . , f,,, then 77 is the clause fl V . . . V fn +-- tl A . . . A t,. 0 
Corollary 14. Learning from finite interpretations reduces to learning from satisjabil- 
ity. 
Notice that the converse of Theorem 13 does not hold, as the negation of a clause 
is not necessarily a (complete) interpretation. It can however be considered a partial 
interpretation, as some facts will be true, others will be false, and still others will 
have an unknown truth-value. More formally: a partial interpretation (over an alphabet) 
consists of a set of true ground facts T and a set of false ground facts F. A Herbrand 
interpretation I (over the same alphabet) extends a partial interpretation (T, F) if and 
only if T C I and F n I = 8. 
’ A skolem substitution substitutes all variables by different constants that are not in the current alphabet. 
5 This restriction to finite interpretations is needed to guarantee that the resulting expressions 17 are finite 
clauses. This is not really a strong restriction, as infinite interpretations cannot be represented explicitly, but 
see 171. 
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Definition 15 (Learning from partial interpretations). If H is a clausal theory and e 
is a partial interpretation then H covers e under partial interpretations, notation e Eri H, 
if and only if e has an extension I that is a model of H. 6 
As for Herbrand interpretations, Z denotes the clausal theory corresponding to the 
partial interpretation e. Furthermore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between finite 
partial interpretations e and clauses 1~. Using this mapping it is easy to prove that: 
Theorem 16. Learning from finite partial interpretations reduces to learning from 
entailment, and vice versa, learning from entailment reduces to learning from jinite 
partial interpretations. 
This theorem demonstrates that learning from entailment and learning from partial 
interpretations are essentially equivalent. Hence, we will not further distinguish among 
them. 
Finally, within inductive logic programming one typically employs also a background 
theory B in the form of a clausal theory, and regards an example e covered by a 
hypothesis H only if B A H k e. 
Definition 17 (Intensional inductive logic programming). If H and B are clausal the- 
ories and e is a clause, then H covers e under intensional inductive logic programming, 
notation e Eint.8 H, if and only if B A H b e. 
Theorem 18. Intensional inductive logic programming reduces to learning from satis- 
jiability. 
Proof. Define p( ( e, Class) ) = ( B A ye, -Class) and consider that e Eini,B H if and 
only if B A Te +I$ H. 0 
The reduction of intensional inductive logic programming to learning from satisjia- 
bility forms another motivation for studying the latter setting. 
A special case, frequently applied in inductive logic programming (e.g. the well- 
known systems Golem [25] and Foil [29] ) and its computational learning theory 
formalisation, assumes that the background theory B consists of a set of ground atoms 
and that the positive examples are true ground atoms and the negative ones false ground 
atoms. This setting is known in the literature as the extensional inductive logic program- 
ming setting. 
Definition 19 (Extensional inductive logic programming). If H is a clausal theory, B 
a set of true ground atoms, and e a ground atom, then H covers e under extensional 
inductive logic programming, notation e Eext,~ H, if and only if B A H b e. 
’ A related learning setting is considered by 1 171, who require that all extensions are a model of the 
hypothesis. 
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Theorem 20. Extensional inductive logic programming reduces to learning from en- 
tailment. 
Proof. Define p( (e, Class)) = (e + B, Class). The result then follows from the fact 
that e &t,~ H iff H + (e c B). 0 
Unfortunately, learning from entailment seems not reducible in this manner to exten- 
sional inductive logic programming. This is because the above transformation assumes 
that when learning from entailment all examples have the same condition part. This 
assumption does not hold in general. Consider e.g. learning p +- q A r from the positive 
example p t q A r A t and the negatives p c q, and p t r. 7 
So far we ignored the fact that many approaches (especially in the domain of in- 
ductive logic programming) assume that the examples when learning from entailment 
are Horn clauses. Let us name this setting Horn-learning from entailment. Trivially, 
this setting can be reduced to learning from entailment. However, it seems impossible 
to reduce learning from interpretations to Horn-learning from entailment. The rea- 
son is that the clauses S obtained from Herbrand interpretations e, are typically not 
Horn. 
3.3. Knowledge representation 
The three main settings, i.e. learning from interpretations, from partial interpreta- 
tions, * and from satisfiability, can also be interpreted from a knowledge representation 
perspective. 
Central to this issue is the question as to what an example represents? The question 
can best be answered in terms of model theory. In terms of model theory, each example 
e corresponds to a set of models M(e), and an example e is covered by a hypothesis 
H if and only if there is a model m E M(e) that is a model of H. Formally: 
Definition 21. If e is a Herbrand interpretation I then M(e) = {I}; if e is a partial 
interpretation then M(e) = {I 1 I is a Herbrand extension of e}; if e is a clausal theory 
then M(e) = {I 1 Z is a Herbrand model for e}. 
Property 22. e gx H iff 3m E M(e): m is a model for H where Ex=Ei or E,i or &. 
This property suggests that the main difference among the three formalizations of 
concept-learning is due to the models M(e) that an example represents. When learning 
from interpretations, M(e) contains a single interpretation. By definition, an interpreta- 
tion assumes complete knowledge. Hence, when learning from interpretations, complete 
7 One might want to consider taking as the extensional background theory the union of the antecedents 
of the examples, and as examples the consequence of the examples. Unfortunately, this does not work (cf. 
the illustration). To make this approach work, one should also change the representation by adding an extra 
argument to all of the predicates, This argument would then contain a unique identifier for the example. 
However, such changes of representation are not permitted within our (strict) notion of reduction. 
* Which is considered here to be equivalent to learning from entailment, cf. above. 
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knowledge about each of the examples is assumed. When learning from partial inter- 
pretations, M(e) contains all extensions of the partial interpretations. The difference 
between the extensions and the partial model is that the extensions assign the value 
true or false to the facts that have an unknown truth-value in the partial interpreta- 
tions. Hence, partial interpretations can represent examples with missing values. When 
learning from clausal theories, M(e) can (depending on the example) contain any set 
of Herbrand interpretations. For example, assume that the truth-value of two proposi- 
tional facts p and q is not known, but it is known that they have identical truth-values. 
One cannot represent this knowledge using a partial interpretation. However, using the 
clausal theory p t q and q +- p will realize the desired effect. This example illus- 
trates that learning from satisfiability allows us to express other types of incomplete 
knowledge. 
This knowledge representation view provides guidance for choosing the right setting 
when modelling an induction task. If complete knowledge about each of the exam- 
ples is available, use learning from interpretations; if some examples have missing 
values, use learning from partial interpretations or learning from entailment; if other 
forms of incomplete examples need to be represented, use learning from satisfiabil- 
ity. 
4. Computational learning theory 
The PAC-learnability of several subclasses of clausal logic has been investigated 
under various membership relations. We first formalize the PAC-learning paradigm in- 
troduced by [30], and then investigate the role of the membership relation for PAC- 
learning. 
4.1. PAC-learning: dejinition 
Let LC be a class of concepts. The target concept t may be any concept in Lc. A 
learning algorithm for Lc is an algorithm that attempts to construct an approximation 
to the target concept from examples for it. The learning algorithm takes as input two 
parameters: the error parameter e E (0, 1 ] and the confidence parameter S E (0, l] . The 
error parameter specifies the error allowed in a good approximation and the confidence 
parameter controls the likelihood of constructing a good approximation. 
The learning algorithm has at its disposal a subroutine EXAMPLE, which at each 
call produces a single example for the target concept t. The probability that a particular 
example e E L, (positive or negative for t) will be produced at a call of EXAMPLE is 
D(e), where D is an arbitrary unknown but fixed distribution on L,. The choice of the 
distribution D is independent of the target concept t. 
Concept g is a good approximation of concept t if the probability that f and g 
differ on a randomly chosen example from L, is at most E, i.e. D(tAg) < E, where 
tAg = t - g U g - t. Putting all of the above together, we obtain the following defini- 
tion. 
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Definition 23. An algorithm A is a probably approximately correct (PAC) learning 
algorithm for a class of learning tasks (Lc, Le, EC) if 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
A takes as input E E (0,1] and S E (0,I 1. 
A calls EXAMPLE, which returns examples for some unknown but fixed t E Lc. 
The examples are chosen randomly according to an unknown but fixed probability 
distribution D on L,. 
For all concepts t E LC and all probability distributions D on Le, A outputs a 
concept g E Lc, such that with probability at least ( 1 - S), D( tAg> < F. 
The time complexity of A is bounded by a polynomial p( l/c, l/&m, size(t)) 
where m is the size of the largest example, and size(t) the size of the target 
concept. 
A class LC is PAC-learnable under EC if there exists an algorithm A which is a PAC- 
learning algorithm for ( Lc, L,, EC). 
Notice that the membership functions & considered in this paper completely deter- 
mine the language of examples L, used. Hence, we say LC is PAC-learnable under EC 
instead of LC is PAC-learnable under EC for the language of examples L, corresponding 
to EC. 
To prove PAC-learning results, one frequently relies on so-called PAC-reductions in- 
troduced by [28] (cf. Chapter 7 of [ 191). We will only consider a special type of 
PAC-reduction, which can be derived from the above introduced notion of a reduc- 
tion: 
Definition 24. A reduction p is efJicient if and only if size(p(e)) is bounded by 
p(size(e)) where p is a polynomial and p can be computed in polynomial time. 
When learning under t, efJiciently reduces to learning under E,, we will write that 
E,~E!. It is clear that 9 is also transitive. 
It is straightforward to prove that all reductions used in the proofs of theorems in 
Section 3, are efficient when natural and comparable size measures are used. 9 
Thus the main result of this paper is: 
Theorem 25. EfJicient reductions 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Learning from _/kite interpretations and extensional inductive logic programming 
eficiently reduce to learning from entailment; 
Learning from entailment eficiently reduces to learning from finite partial inter- 
pretations, and vice versa, 
Learning from entailment and fromJinite partial interpretations efJiciently reduce 
to intensional inductive logic programming, 
Intensional inductive logic programming eficiently reduces to learning from 
satisjability. 
YThis implies that when learning from interpretations, the size of an interpretation takes into account (i.e. 
sums) the sizes of the set of true and the set of false facts, which contrasts with [ 71, who take into account 
only the size of the true facts, Using the sum is necessary because the reduction from Ei to e.g. EC results in 
clauses that contain both true as well as false facts. 
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In graphical form Theorem 25 yields: 
This result is important in the light of PAC-learning because: 
Theorem 26. If there is an e$‘icient reduction from learning under E, to learning 
under E? and LC is PAC-learnable under E!, then LC is also PAC-learnable under 
Ex. 
Proof. This follows from the observations that ( 1) if there is an efficient reduction from 
learning under E, to learning under Ed then (Lc, L,, E,) PAC-reduces to ( Lc, L,, E,.); 
and (2) if (Lc, L,, E,) PAC-reduces to (Lc. LY, E!), and ( Lc, L,, Ed) is PAC-learnable 
then ( Lc, L,, E,) is PAC-learnable. 
(1) follows directly from the definition of a PAC-reduction (see e.g. [ 19, p. 147]), 
because 
l an efficient reduction p can serve as an efficient instance transformation that maps 
examples in L, on examples in LY, and 
l the existence of an image concept is trivial as the concept classes considered are 
identical, 
l the instance mapping preserves concept membership. lo 
(2) is a direct application of Theorem 7.2. in [ 191, or the results by [28]. 0 
4.2. PAC-learning and logic 
Computational learning theory has investigated the learnability of several classes of 
logical hypotheses, under various coverage notions. 
First, k-CNF, the class of all CNF formulae that contain at most k literals per clause 
[30], and jk-CT, the class of all CT formulae that contain at most k literals of size 
at most j per clause [7] are efficiently PAC-learnable from interpretations (both from 
positive and from positive and negative examples). We will now show that k-CNF is 
not efficiently PAC-learnable under entailment. Though one might consider learning k- 
CNF under entailment inappropriate from a PAC-learning point of view as membership 
testing under entailment is NP-hard, this theorem does show that learning k-CNF under 
entailment is not PAC-reducible to learning k-CNF under interpretations. This in turn 
suggests that learning under entailment is not only more general but also computationally 
harder than learning from interpretations. 
Theorem 27. k-CNF is not ejficiently PAC-learnable under entailment,for k 2 3. 
“‘Though the usual definition of PAC-reduction requires that the instance mapping maps positives onto 
positives and negatives onto negatives (and hence that concept-membership is preserved, it is easily proven 
that result (2) also holds when positives are mapped onto negatives and vice versa (and hence that negated 
membership is preserved), cf. the proof of Theorem 7.2 in [ 19 I. 
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Proof. Due to the results of [27] it suffices to show that finding a solution to the 
learning problem (the so-called consistency problem) is NP-hard. 
The consistency problem can be used to solve the well-known NP-hard 3-SAT prob- 
lem. 3-SAT is the problem of determining whether a 3-CNF formula is satisfiable or 
not. 
Consider a 3-CNF formula T = r\yL, (/;,I V Z;,2 V li,3) over IZ propositional predicates. 
Consider the equivalent learning problem, where P = {lL,l V li.2 V li,~ ( 1 < i < m} and 
N = {0} (where the only negative example is the unsatisfiable clause). 
We still have to prove that the 3-CNF formula is satisfiable if and only if the learning 
problem has a solution: if the learning problem has a solution H, then H b T and 
H # 0, therefore T # 0; if T is satisfiable, then the learning problem has a solution, 
i.e. H = T. 0 
Similarly, one can prove 
Theorem 28. jk-CT for 3 < k is not PAC-learnable under entailment. 
Corollary 29. k-CNF and jk-CT for 3 < k are not PAC-learnable under Eint,B and E,. 
Secondly, various classes of concepts have been investigated within the inductive 
logic programming paradigm, see [ 3,4,20] for overviews. Most of these results concern 
definite clauses under gext,s. All of the negative results for this settings carry over to 
learning under Ed, Eri, Eini,s and ~~ because of Theorems 25 and 26. On the other hand, 
positive results for Ee or Es carry over to Ei. 
Finally, Horn-CNF, the class of CNF formulae that are Horn, are learnable using 
membership and equivalence queries from interpretations [ 1 ] and from entailment [ 151. 
This also means that they are PAC-learnable if membership questions are available. ” 
At present, it remains an open question as to whether these results can be upgraded 
towards restricted sets of first order logic and whether they would carry over to learning 
under Eint.8 or Ed. On the other hand, due to the equivalence of & and Eri, Horn-CNF 
should be learnable in the same manner from partial interpretations. 
5. Related work 
The presented work is related to and motivated by some of the results by [2] and 
[ 151 who study the relation between learning from entailment and learning from inter- 
pretations when membership and equivalence queries are available. However, our results 
do not assume that queries are available. 
Secondly, our results are also related to those by [ 3 1 ] who study the relation among 
several inductive logic programming settings. In particular, they studied the influence of 
testing coverage at the local level (i.e. representing each example by a separate logical 
theory) or at the global level (i.e. representing the example set as a whole by a single 
” A membership question asks an oracle whether or not an example belongs to the target concept. 
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logical theory), and the differences between predictive and descriptive inductive logic 
programming. Wrobel and Dieroski also propose to use E, to test for coverage (in 
one of their settings). However, they did not specify the language of examples and 
hypotheses, which is crucial for obtaining our results. From this point of view, the main 
novelty in learning from satisfiability is the use of full clausal theories to represent 
hypotheses and examples. 
Finally, several of our results relate to Peter Flach’s inquiry into the logic of induction 
[ 12-141. Flach’s work provides a normative semantic account of inductive reasoning in 
which meta-rules are used to describe various properties of inductive reasoning. Flach 
distinguishes explanatory from confirmatory induction using these meta-rules. Explana- 
tory induction is related to learning from entailment, whereas confirmatory induction 
is closer to learning from interpretations or learning from satisfiability. The main dif- 
ference between Flach’s work and ours, is that Flach assumes that the example set is 
represented by a single logical theory, whereas in our framework each example cor- 
responds to a logical formula. This is important as in Flach’s work positive as well 
as negative examples are handled identically (though a positive example would be a 
true clause, and a negative one the negation of a clause). This not only complicates 
the logic I2 but also makes it hard to view Flach’s setting as concept-learning, because 
the latter is typically concerned with positive and negative examples as well as with 
classification. This is further illustrated by Flach’s notion of learning from satisfiability, 
which requires that H A E # 0 where E is the complete example set. Flach views this 
as confirmatory induction, of which the prime characteristic is that it is not classification 
oriented. Our framework shows that it is feasible and interesting to adapt this notion for 
classification-oriented concept-learning. 
6. Conclusions 
Our results allow us to formulate answers to the open questions in the introduction. 
First, the relation among learning from interpretations and learning from entailment, 
raised in various forms within computational learning theory and inductive logic pro- 
gramming [ 7,8,15,24,3 1 ] is now clarified. Secondly, whereas attribute value learning 
techniques have mostly learned from interpretations and inductive logic programming 
from entailment, our results indicate that even in the propositional case inductive logic 
programming is more general and harder (as illustrated by k-CNF). Thirdly, the result 
on k-CNF indicates that the normal inductive logic programming setting (as formal- 
ized in learning from entailment) is computationally harder than the non-monotonic 
setting (as formalized by [ 71). This last contribution confirms some of the earlier 
intuitions about the differences between the non-monotonic setting and normal induc- 
tive logic programming as formulated by e.g. [8,24] and between weak and strong 
induction [ 121. 
I2 To require that negative statements are entailed, Flach needs to rely on non-monotonic logic. Furthermore, 
negative examples are sometimes added to the background theory, which seems counter-intuitive. 
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Finally, we also leave open a number of questions. First, about learning under satis- 
fiability, one may wonder whether there exist still reasonable classes that are learnable 
and also, what algorithms can be used to do so. Some of the latter issues are addressed 
by [ 51. Second, our main results concern full clausal logic, whereas in practice one 
mostly considers Horn logic only. As a consequence, if one requires that examples are 
Horn-clauses when learning from entailment, then the relation to learning from interpre- 
tations is less clear. Third, within inductive logic programming, most of the learnability 
results (see [ 31) are very specific within our framework as they concern G~~,B. Fur- 
thermore, though they typically assume a bound j on the arity of predicates in the 
background theory, they do not impose a bound on the arity of the predicates to be 
learned (because otherwise the learning task is considered trivial). An alternative would 
be to simply employ learning from entailment with one size measure on the length 
of clauses (and the possibility of also using bounds on the arity of predicates to be 
learned). This type of learning has been addressed by the algorithmic learning theory 
community (cf. [ 18,23,26] ) 
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